“Big War” Air Power for “Small War” Operations (RCAF Journal - SUMMER 2015 - Volume 4, Issue 3)

10th Anniversary Edition

 

Table of contents

 

By Wing Commander David Glasson, Royal Australian Air Force

Reprint from The Royal Canadian Air Force Journal Vol. 3, No. 1, Winter 2014

Editor’s note: The views expressed in this work are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defence, the Royal Australian Air Force, the Government of Australia or any other authority referred to in the text. The Commonwealth of Australia will not be legally responsible in contract, tort or otherwise for any statements made in this document.

Introduction

An air force’s first duty is the defence of the nation from foreign aggression, but in today’s global environment this high-level state-versus-state conflict seems a remote possibility. In contrast, the past 60 years have seen air forces predominantly fighting smaller, more unconventional wars. In order to ensure the right balance of air force structure, it is essential to understand the most likely scenarios for the employment of air power. In many situations, these less conventional operations have progressed from an initial conventional big-war phase, such as involving removal of the established regime, to a longer period of unconventional warfare including counter-insurgency (COIN) operations. This issue affects not only the type of aircraft and weapons platforms used but also how they are employed.

The nature of irregular warfare is that no situation or opponent is likely to be the same. Certainly, there are shared experiences and lessons, but it is essential that air forces are not geared to fight the last war. Accordingly, it is posited that air forces should maintain a foundation based on conventional air power but be adaptable to meet the challenges of irregular warfare.

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Conventional air power doctrine

During the cold-war era, Canada geared its air power to fight the big-war threat posed by the Soviet Bloc. The period since the end of the cold war saw a significant reduction in the size of the Canadian Forces with more emphasis on joint interaction.[1] This time has, however, seen numerous operations in support of smaller conflicts, yet air power doctrine has continued to focus on the primary aim of protecting a nation’s citizens and primary interests.[2] Doctrine determines the method of command and control, the force structure and the concept of operations. Aerospace doctrine also determines the types of weapon platforms and, in particular, the aircraft types to be acquired and how they will be employed.

Figure 1 illustrates the interrelationship of the six Royal Canadian Air Force functions: Command; Act, which comprises two subfunctions (Shape and Move); Sense; Shield; Generate; and Sustain. The enabling functions (Shield, Generate and Sustain) are equally spaced on a large outer ring. Within the outer ring, the core functions (Command, Act and Sense) are placed in their own rectangles and form a pyramid. Command is top centre; Act (Move and Shape) is bottom right; and Sense is bottom left. An arrow runs from the bottom of the Act rectangle to a circle labelled “Effects.” From this circle, a second arrow runs to the bottom of the Sense rectangle. The overlap between Sense and Command is labelled “Assess,” and the overlap between Command and Act is labelled “Plan.” Inside the Command rectangle, a downward arrow runs from Command to a small circle labelled “Decide.” An arrow labelled “Current State” runs from “Assess” (overlap of Sense and Command) to “Decide.” A second arrow labelled “Direct” runs from “Decide” to “Plan” (overlap of Command and Act). End Figure 1

Figure 1. Royal Canadian Air Force functions

The Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) defines three core functions of air power: Command, Act and Sense. These core functions are displayed with the surrounding enabling functions in Figure 1[3]. Command incorporates the term command and control, encompassing systems, procedures and structures in order for the commander to direct their authority.[4] Conventional command practices have a foundation in the hierarchical structure of the continental staff system.[5] The Sense function includes collecting and processing data, which in the conventional meaning is aimed at a strategic level of the “situational awareness of the land, air and maritime approaches.”[6] The Act function includes the operations that involve manoeuvre, firepower and information gathering and is divided into the two subfunctions of Shape and Move.[7] The Shape subfunction, control of the air, is a cornerstone of conventional warfare. It includes the support of land and sea forces through close air support, interdiction and strike capabilities. Move deals with air mobility and personnel recovery. Both of these areas are formed and structured for conventional war scenarios.

Canada has specific requirements to maintain essential conventional air power functions in order to fulfil the obligations of the contribution to the North American Aerospace Defence Command, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and its unique role in the protection of the Arctic.[8] Canada must, therefore, maintain a fundamental capability of conventional air power functions to meet these obligations. It is essential that Canada maintain its conventional edge which has been the key to past successes and will continue to be necessary in the future.[9]

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Defining small war operations

The NATO Joint Air Power Competence Centre describes three operational themes of future warfare: big war, long war and contained war. Big war is classed as a conventional state-versus-state confrontation. Long war is defined as “countering irregular activity,” while contained war is limited to “inter alia denial, blockade, and no-fly zones.”[10] Small-war operations can be classed as a combination of the second and third themes—countering irregular activity and the limited operation of a contained war.

Irregular warfare is nothing new; it has been documented from rebellions in ancient times through to its prevalence in modern-day conflicts. Throughout this period, the methods of fighting have been broad, including guerrilla warfare, insurgency and terrorism.[11] Adapting air power to meet this range of possible scenarios is a difficult undertaking, as there is unlikely to be a one-size-fits-all approach.[12] This leads to the conclusion that air forces need to determine a foundation for their air power doctrine and then maintain the ability to adapt that capability to meet the challenges of the specific irregular war situation. Steven Metz argues that COIN operations need to be undertaken less as a belligerent nation but more as a “neutral mediator and peacemaker” and goes on to argue that the best option is to reduce the “human suffering that is associated with the violence.”[13] Air power can play a significant role in this regard and should be part of a comprehensive approach to irregular warfare.[14] This further implies that it is unfeasible to design an air force around one specific small-war possibility. Air forces should, therefore, determine the best way to adapt air power for small wars and remain flexible to meet the changing operational requirements.

Air power in contained war operations

Contained war can be an effective means of providing assistance to the local population, either against insurgencies or against ruling governments. The recent NATO assistance to insurgent forces in Libya was an outstanding example of the use of air power in a contained war. The establishment of a no-fly zone removed the Libyan government’s ability to use air power against its own people and essentially “levelled the playing field” for the rebels.[15] Special operations airlift forces were able to retrieve Western personnel from harm’s way. These operations were a clear message of support to the insurgents and against the established regime. In contrast, the blockade and no-fly zones over Iraq against the Saddam Hussein administration were less effective in enforcing the United Nation’s mandate on Iraq. Both of these examples, however, demonstrate the successful use of more conventional air power with its specific weaponry, in a smaller war operation.[16]

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Air power in COIN operations

Air power often provides an essential asymmetric advantage over irregular forces and ensures a high level of speed, flexibility and reach.[17] Conventional forces find it difficult to adapt to counter insurgent tactics and need to tailor their actions to meet the specific threat and environment they face. The conventional success of the Iraq “shock and awe” campaign was followed by years of COIN operations and nation building. The Afghan campaign showed that more effective results could be achieved by “lighter, mobile ground forces supported by precision air power.”[18] Dubbed the Afghan model, small numbers of special forces operate integrally with air power and local troops.[19] This leads to the use of more network-enabled operations (NEO) where smaller units are able to react swiftly and with a greater amount of local knowledge. To support these operations, air power has the ability to perform these functions through “centralized control and decentralized execution.”[20] This allows for the effective and efficient allocating of limited and costly air resources. Air power can provide a range of capabilities to counter the insurgent forces including air strike, information operations and air mobility.

Air strike

In conventional thinking, air power provides the ability to “strike at an adversary’s … center of gravity” using precision kinetic activity.[21] Generally, irregular forces are more dispersed and do not present the same centre-of-gravity targets as conventional forces. A precise strike capability, however, provides many advantages in small wars, such as the ability to destroy centres of operations, deny safe havens and ensure the continual dispersal of insurgent forces. In addition to this strategic role of precision strike, close air support provides an essential tactical role. This includes a range of options to rapidly respond to the needs of ground forces with precision engagement to physically destroy the insurgent forces. Conventional strike/fighter jets are able to loiter over the battlefield and be called onto targets with accurate methods such as laser designation.[22]

One of the arguments against the use of conventional fast jet aircraft is that they usually deploy from rear-echelon, safe, support bases, some distance from the forward area. This requires aircraft to be pre-deployed ahead of planned ground operations or extends the lead time to respond to the requests of ground forces.[23] An alternative to conventional aircraft would be using smaller aircraft that are custom designed for COIN operations. Smaller, customized, manned aircraft (like the Skyraider used in Vietnam) provide a specialized alternative but are vulnerable to small arms and man-portable air-defence systems. Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) have adapted well to this role by being able to be forward deployed, being responsive to ground forces and delivering precise munitions, even if of a lower calibre than larger manned aircraft.[24] UAVs have proven an effective addition to the air power regime in big wars such as DESERT STORM and likewise in small wars such as in Kosovo. Conventional aircraft are still able to provide the “big hitting” power that may be needed to support planned operations.

The air strike capability can present a number of issues in the small-war environment. The prime objective of current United States and coalition forces in recent Middle East operations has been the protection of the local population.[25] Air strike can “tend to aggravate an insurgency situation”[26] by producing collateral damage or simply by causing fear in the civilian populace. It is, therefore, essential to make sound and considered judgements relating to targeting, using the most accurate and timely information possible.

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Information operations

Accurate and timely information is critical to effectively counter insurgent forces. The RCAF Sense function includes a number of information operations such as intelligence, surveillance, targeting acquisition and reconnaissance (ISTAR) as well as airborne command and control. Airborne assets are able to collect and disseminate a range of information, including signals, communications as well as fixed and moving target imagery.[27] This information can then be rapidly disseminated to commanders or direct to ground forces, enabling network-enabled operation. These air-power assets are most efficiently controlled through a centralized command to minimize duplication and ensure the appropriate level of joint force priority of limited resources.[28]

Irregular forces are often widely dispersed and integrated into the general civilian community. Air power has proven critical in being able to locate, identify and track insurgents and their leaders.[29] Surveillance can be conducted around the clock on compounds, routes and suspected locations. Current airborne technological equipment can track back from an improvised explosive device to locate the bomb-making facility or trace the launch point of rocket or mortar attacks.[30]

In Afghanistan, these functions have been provided by both conventional and purpose-built platforms. Conven-tional ISTAR platforms (such as E-3D Sentry, Sentinel R1, Nimrod R1 and RAPTOR-equipped Tornado GR4s) have been deployed against irregular opponents in both Iraq and Afghanistan with positive results.[31] These conventional platforms are often adapted to suit the specific requirements of COIN operations. For example, the RCAF CP140 Aurora and the Royal Australian Air Force P3-C Orion were procured primarily as maritime surveillance and antisubmarine platforms. In addition to conducting a maritime role against irregular sea forces, however, these platforms have been modified to conduct ground ISTAR operations in Afghanistan, providing imagery and myriad other surveillance techniques.[32] Other conventional aircraft that have been designed for explicit purposes (such as the B-1 and B-52 bombers plus fast jet fighters) and are not normally considered traditional ISTAR platforms have demonstrated a “significant ability to gather intelligence.”[33]

UAVs have proven to be extremely successful in the ISTAR role. The Canadian Forces identified the requirement for unmanned vehicles in this role and responded by procuring the Heron UAV at “record speed.”[34] This demonstrates the importance of an air force being able to adapt to meet the changing needs of technology and the strategic environment.

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Air mobility

Air power provides an important function in providing air mobility in small wars. General Norton Schwartz argues that air mobility is “air power’s greatest contribution in counter insurgency” and that it plays a pivotal role in the COIN effort.[35] This is due to the ability to transport high volumes of troops and materiel over a long distance in a very short time period. Air mobility provides the ability for a force to manoeuvre as defined in the Move subfunction of the RCAF’s Act function. Air mobility also provides the supporting function of Sustain.

Air mobility provides the essential reach that armed forces need to operate in a foreign country. COIN forces are often deployed to remote locations, and air mobility is essential for infiltration, exfiltration and ongoing logistical support. In addition to this physical support, airlift provides important support for morale. This has an extremely positive effect of reducing the COIN forces’ sense of isolation and provides them the confidence that they will be “reinforced, supplied and evacuated when needed.”[36]

One of the advantages of air mobility in COIN operations is that it can overcome the problems faced by ground transport. Intra-theatre lines of communication are often over difficult terrain and involve poor local ground transportation networks. Furthermore, ground transport convoys are highly attractive and vulnerable targets for insurgents.[37] Air mobility offers the essential tool to overcome these obstacles and provides the critical manoeuvre element. In Afghanistan, road convoys are particularly vulnerable to Taliban attack through the use of suicide bombers, mines and improvised explosive devices, prompting Lieutenant-Colonel Ian Hope, former commander of Task Force Orion, to state: “That has produced a risk that would be reduced if we could take helicopter flights.”[38] Following recommendations of the Manley Report, the RCAF purchased an initial six CH147D Chinooks from the United States and began a long process to improve its heavy-lift helicopter fleet.[39]

In addition to supporting COIN forces, air mobility can provide a high level of psychological influence on the civilian population by supporting the incumbent government and by providing humanitarian and medical assistance. This role of nation building is immediately visible and improves the quality of life for the general population.[40]

Air mobility is also a joint enabling force, allowing the option for smaller ground units to conduct operations over a wider, more dispersed area.[41] This has proven to have a successful force multiplier effect in numerous COIN situations. In countering the irregular forces in Algeria, the French used air mobility to avoid larger concentrations of force and opted for smaller dispersed units with lower levels of command.[42] This strategy of using air mobility as a force multiplier has also been used successfully by the British in Kenya, Malaya and Oman.[43]

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In conducting this range of operations, the air force can rely on its general airlift capabilities with only minor adjustments to the method of employment, doctrine and training.[44] At the tactical level, conventional and unconventional warfare can be essentially the same, yet planners and operators need to amend their tactics to suit the specific threat environment. This may require random scheduling as well as changes to routing and flight profiles, as the intelligence regarding insurgents’ weaponry and areas of operation are updated.

COIN intra-theatre air mobility would, however, require a different balance of the type of aircraft used, in contrast to state-versus-state warfare. A smaller proportion of heavy airlift would be needed, with a greater reliance on smaller, quick-response missions and, therefore, suitably capable aircraft to meet those objectives.[45]

Adapting conventional air power for small wars

While maintaining a foundation of doctrine, structure, tactics and aircraft based on the concepts of conventional warfare, an air force needs to be able to adapt to meet the specialized demands of the small-war environment. Robert Owen remonstrates that an air force should be capable of adapting to different types of war instead of focusing on one particular type of warfare.[46] This follows from the principle that COIN air operations, while having certain specific requirements, do not differ drastically from conventional air operations. The British Chief of the Air Staff, Air Chief Marshal Sir Stephen Dalton, argues that the “Afghan model may not fit future scenarios” and that air power should maintain the flexibility to act “against technically and militarily proficient adversaries” in future operations.[47]

To be able to adapt to a small-war environment, an air force should maintain a centre of expertise in COIN warfare and ensure the ongoing development and education in small-war concepts.[48] It is also essential to continue to develop joint doctrine on the use of air power and have aviation specialists integrally involved in the joint-planning and decision-making processes.[49] Procurement processes should also be streamlined to ensure specialized aircraft can be acquired to meet the threat environment. The C-17 and Heron projects are prime examples of how this can be achieved.[50] 

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Conclusion

Although small wars share certain similar characteristics, no two will encounter the same strategic environment or tactical scenarios. An air force should not, therefore, be structured to fight the last war. The first priority of a nation’s defence force is to defend the homeland and its national interests, and Canada has a number of obligations that require the maintenance of conventional air forces. Air power should, therefore, have a foundation of doctrine, structure and aircraft types based on conventional war fighting. Due to the nature of warfare and the ever-changing global situation, this foundation would be geared to respond to new challenges and adapt its capabilities accordingly.

Air power provides an essential asymmetric advantage in COIN operations, particularly in the elements of air strike, information operations and air mobility. Conventional air strike capabilities have proven adaptable to the requirements of COIN warfare with an understanding of the need for accurate information and precision targeting. Canada has adapted quickly to adopt the use of UAVs in this role. Conventional aircraft have also proven efficient in information operations with modifications to technology and operating tactics. Air mobility has proven to be a pivotal function in small wars, yet the operations are essentially the same in conventional and unconventional warfare. Once again, adapting to the operating environment is the key to successful air power. It is, therefore, fundamental that air forces should maintain a foundation based on conventional air power yet be adaptable to meet the challenges of irregular warfare.


Wing Commander David Glasson is an experienced Royal Australian Air Force transport pilot and qualified flying instructor. He recently graduated from the Canadian Forces College Joint Command and Staff Program and is currently serving in the active reserve in capability development at Headquarters Air Lift Group.

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Abbreviations

COIN―counter-insurgency
DND―Department of National Defence
ISTAR―intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance
JAPCC―Joint Air Power Competence Centre
NATO―North Atlantic Treaty Organization
RCAF―Royal Canadian Air Force
UAV―unmanned aerial vehicle

Notes

[1]. Australia, Royal Australian Air Force, Australian Air Publication (AAP) 1000-D, The Air Power Manual (Canberra, ACT: Air Power Development Centre, 2007), 53.  (return)

[2]. Canada, DND, B-GA-400-000/FP-000, 37. (return)

[3]. Canada, Department of National Defence (DND), B-GA-400-000/FP-000, Canadian Forces Aerospace Doctrine, 2nd ed. (Trenton, ON: Canadian Forces Aerospace Warfare Centre, 2010), 17, accessed July 8, 2013, http://www.rcaf-arc.forces.gc.ca/cfawc/CDD/Doctrine_e.asp. (return)

[4]. Allan English, Command and Control of Canadian Aerospace Forces: Conceptual Foundations (Trenton, ON: Canadian Forces Aerospace Warfare Centre, 2008), 24, accessed July 8, 2013, http://www.rcaf-arc.forces.gc.ca/CFAWC/eLibrary/pubs/C2_Conceptual_Foundations_e.asp. (return)

[5]. Canada, DND, B-GA-400-000/FP-000, 38. (return)

[6]. Canada, DND, B-GA-400-000/FP-000, 38. (return)

[7]. Canada, DND, B-GA-400-000/FP-000, 35. (return)

[8]. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Joint Air Power Competence Centre (JAPCC), “Air Power in Countering Irregular Warfare” (Kalkar, Germany: Joint Air Power Competence Centre, June 2008), 18, accessed July 8, 2013, http://www.japcc.de/fileadmin/user_upload/projects/expeditionary_security/080609_Air_Power_in_Countering_Irregular_Warfare.pdf. (return)

[9]. Allen Peck, “Air Power’s Crucial Role in Irregular Warfare,” Air and Space Power Journal (Summer 2007): 11, accessed July 8, 2013, http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=cab359a3-9328-19cc-a1d2-8023e646b22c&lng=en&id=120059. (return)

[10]. For both quotations, NATO, JAPCC, 4. (return)

[11]. Colin S. Gray, “Irregular Warfare: One Nature, Many Characters,” Strategic Studies Quarterly 1, no. 2 (Winter 2007): 37. (return)

[12]. Allan English, Command and Control of Canadian Aerospace Forces: Conceptual Foundations (Trenton, ON: Canadian Forces Aerospace Warfare Centre, 2008), 18, accessed July 8, 2013, http://www.rcaf-arc.forces.gc.ca/CFAWC/eLibrary/pubs/C2_Conceptual_Foundations_e.asp. (return)

[13]. Steven Metz, “New Challenges and Old Concepts: Understanding 21st Century Insurgency,” Parameters 37, no. 4 (Winter 2007–08): 31. (return)

[14]. NATO, JAPCC, 1. (return)

[15]. Christian Anrig, “Allied Air Power over Libya,” Air and Space Power Journal (Winter 2011): 104. (return)

[16]. Mark Tobin, “Operation IRAQI FREEDOM Air Campaign: A Tactical Military Success, or a Strategic Information Failure?” Air Power Review 14, no. 3 (Autumn/Winter 2011): 109. (return)

[17]. Norton Swartz, “Airpower in Counterinsurgency and Stability Operations,” PRISM 2, no. 2 (March 2011): 128. (return)

[18]. Mark Tobin, “Operation IRAQI FREEDOM Air Campaign: A Tactical Military Success, or a Strategic Information Failure?” Air Power Review 14, no. 3 (Autumn/Winter 2011): 102. (return)

[19]. Richard Andres, “The Afghan Model in Northern Iraq,” Journal of Strategic Studies 29, no. 3 (June 2006): 395–422. (return)

[20]. Allen Peck, “Air Power’s Crucial Role in Irregular Warfare,” Air and Space Power Journal (Summer 2007):  12. (return)

[21]. Allen Peck, “Air Power’s Crucial Role in Irregular Warfare,” Air and Space Power Journal (Summer 2007): 11. (return)

[22]. Norton Swartz, “Airpower in Counterinsurgency and Stability Operations,” PRISM 2, no. 2 (March 2011):  131. (return)

[23]. Major Arthur Davis, “Back to the Basics: An Aviation Solution to Counterinsurgent Warfare” (Air Command and Staff College research paper, United States Air Force, Air University, December 2005), 7. (return)

[24]. NATO, JAPCC, 19. (return)

[25]. Norton Swartz, “Airpower in Counterinsurgency and Stability Operations,” PRISM 2, no. 2 (March 2011): 130. (return)

[26]. B. Raman, “Counter-Insurgency: Use of Air Power Vs Use of Air Force,” South Asia Analyst Group Paper No. 3756, (April 2010), 1, accessed April 5, 2012, http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers38/paper3756.html (site discontinued). (return)

[27]. Allen Peck, “Air Power’s Crucial Role in Irregular Warfare,” Air and Space Power Journal (Summer 2007):  13. (return)

[28]. Allen Peck, “Air Power’s Crucial Role in Irregular Warfare,” Air and Space Power Journal (Summer 2007): 13. (return)

[29]. Norton Swartz, “Airpower in Counterinsurgency and Stability Operations,” PRISM 2, no. 2 (March 2011):  131. (return)

[30]. Allen Peck, “Air Power’s Crucial Role in Irregular Warfare,” Air and Space Power Journal (Summer 2007): 13. (return)

[31]. Stuart Evans, “Combat-ISTAR: A New Philosophy on the Battle for Information in the Future Operating Environment,” Air Power Review 14, no. 3 (Autumn/Winter 2011): 4. (return)

[32]. Roy Braybrook, “Looking Down from a Great Height,” Armada International, accessed July 8, 2013, http://readperiodicals.com/201112/2536740831.html. (return)

[33]. Norton Swartz, “Airpower in Counterinsurgency and Stability Operations,” PRISM 2, no. 2 (March 2011): 134. (return)

[34]. Captain Kyle Welsh, “Task Force Erebus: Providing Essential Support for Canada’s Mission in Afghanistan,” Canadian Air Force Journal 3, no. 2 (Spring 2010): 19, accessed July 8, 2013, http://airforceapp.forces.gc.ca/CFAWC/eLibrary/Journal/Vol3-2010/Iss2-Spring_e.asp. (return)

[35]. Norton Swartz, “Airpower in Counterinsurgency and Stability Operations,” PRISM 2, no. 2 (March 2011):  128. (return)

[36]. Robert Owen and Karl P. Mueller, “Airlift Capabilities for Future U.S. Counterinsurgency Operations” (Santa Monica: RAND, 2007), 42. (return)

[37]. Norton Swartz, “Airpower in Counterinsurgency and Stability Operations,” PRISM 2, no. 2 (March 2011):  128. (return)

[38]. Defence Industry Daily, “On the Verge: Canada’s $4B+ Program for Medium-Heavy Transport Helicopters,” Defence Industry Daily, accessed July 8, 2013, http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/on-the-verge-canadas-47b-program-for-mediumheavy-transport-helicopters-02390/. (return)

[39]. John Manley and others, “Independent Panel on Canada’s Future Role in Afghanistan” (Ottawa: Public Works and Government Services, January 2008), 27, accessed July 8, 2013, http://www.afghanistan.gc.ca/canada-afghanistan/assets/pdfs/Afghan_Report_web_e.pdf. (return)

[40]. Allen Peck, “Air Power’s Crucial Role in Irregular Warfare,” Air and Space Power Journal (Summer 2007): 14. (return)

[41]. NATO, JAPCC, 8. (return)

[42]. Major Arthur Davis, “Back to the Basics: An Aviation Solution to Counterinsurgent Warfare” (Air Command and Staff College research paper, United States Air Force, Air University, December 2005), 16. (return)

[43]. Robert Owen and Karl P. Mueller, “Airlift Capabilities for Future U.S. Counterinsurgency Operations” (Santa Monica: RAND, 2007), 33. (return)

[44]. Robert Owen and Karl P. Mueller, “Airlift Capabilities for Future U.S. Counterinsurgency Operations” (Santa Monica: RAND, 2007), 33 and xv. (return)

[45]. Robert Owen and Karl P. Mueller, “Airlift Capabilities for Future U.S. Counterinsurgency Operations” (Santa Monica: RAND, 2007), xii. (return)

[46]. Robert Owen, “Structuring Global Air Forces for Counterinsurgency Operations,” in No Clear Flight Plan: Counterinsurgency and Aerospace Power, Silver Dart Canadian Aerospace Studies IV, ed. James Fergusson and William March (Winnipeg: Centre for Defence and Security Studies, University of Manitoba, 2008), 234. (return)

[47]. David Stubbs, “Afghanistan Needs Our Air Power Not Our ‘Boots on the Ground’” (RAFCAPS Discussion Paper No. 3, Air Media Centre, HQ Air Command, 2010), 4. (return)

[48]. Alan Vick and others, “Air Power in the New Counterinsurgency Era: The Strategic Importance of USAF Advisory and Assistance Missions” (Santa Monica: RAND, 2006), 135. (return)

[49]. Alan Vick and others, “Air Power in the New Counterinsurgency Era: The Strategic Importance of USAF Advisory and Assistance Missions” (Santa Monica: RAND, 2006), 137. (return)

[50]. Captain Kyle Welsh, “Task Force Erebus: Providing Essential Support for Canada’s Mission in Afghanistan,” Canadian Air Force Journal 3, no. 2 (Spring 2010): 19, accessed July 8, 2013, http://airforceapp.forces.gc.ca/CFAWC/eLibrary/Journal/Vol3-2010/Iss2-Spring_e.asp. (return)

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